Crackdown!

The Islamic Republic seems to be escalating their liberty repression these days with the presidential election season kicking in:

1) The Iranian cabinet is currently reviewing a draft that would make journalism in Iran completely beholden to the government if implemented as the official professional "journalism guidelines". This is a legislative act that may be argued against as the executive stepping outside of its constitutional powers.

According to the Rooz report, "All powers ‎relating to the selection of journalism permit committee are transferred to the Ministry of ‎Culture and Islamic Guidance, meaning that the committee’s nine members will be ‎selected by the ministry’s deputy in press and media affairs. In addition, the committee ‎will be headed by the ministry’s deputy."‎ This in essence means that the committee will be fully in charge of ‎determining the criteria for issuance and cancellation of journalist identification cards, and rights to being a professional journalist.

2) In an effort to silence foreign journalists, Iran has jailed freelance journalist Roxana Saberi, for operating without a license to practice journalism. She had her press credentials revoked a couple of years ago, but decided to stay in Iran to do research for a book and finish a master's degree.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Qashqavi explained during a press conference that the case was now in the hands of the justice ministry, expressing that "Since 2006 when her press accreditation was revoked, she should not have illegally sought to gather information and news in Iran."

This is an interesting excuse considering she has been reporting on short pieces in Iran for NPR since 2006 with government knowledge and acquiescence.

3) Reformist, and even possible principle-ist, candidate's websites are being heavily filtered inside of Iran. Khatami's websites yarri.ir and yarrinews.com have been filtered heavily recently. They are operated by young independent, activist journalists and are seen by regime hardliners as tools to spread "lies" about the regime. Additionally, mayor of Tehran Qalibaf (a possible principle-ist oppostition to Ahmadinejead) has already had his Tehran municipality site blocked once for insulting Ahmadinejad's economic policies, but this time his election supporter site is getting some blockage.

In addition, Khatami is getting no coverage in the official, or semi-official, IRI news sites such as IRNA, Mehd News, or Fars news. These are a major source of news for the populace, but with official control the news is very regime-heavy, with no oppositional voice or any 'bad' news regarding regime actions, policy, or standard current events.

With the election coming up it will be important to note the massive crackdowns, such as the one last week at Amir Kabir University in Tehran. Here is some inside knowledge on it. This was a classic representation of what the thug elements of the Basij will be escalating for the next few months I imagine, after their tasking by Khamenei, as I've mentioned before. The principal-ists, whether it be Ahmadinejad, or whoever have the institutions of the regime at their disposal in order to assist in repression of the opposition. This regime does not mess around.

And it begins... Khatami vs. Ahmadinejad?

Nobody really has been blogging about this article in the LA Times today, but I thought it was good. The Iranian presidential election, officially in June, has begun to pick up. The candidates are starting to campaign, and the rhetoric is picking up from the "principal-ists" against Khatami, and from Khatami against Ahmadinejad's legacy. Besides the political pop-shots that are typical, several developments have played out quickly over the last few weeks:

1) Ahmadinejad took his campaign to Yazd, the home of Khatami, to give a speech, and show he is willing to take it directly at Khatami, who he sees as his biggest rival at this point.

2) Keyhan, and its editor Shari'atmadari, have not just compared Khatami to Benazir Bhutto, but actually predicted that Khatami will be assassinated like she was as a reformer. Not by the principal-ists of course, but by US decree (like in Pakistan of course).

3) Just today, center-right reformist candidate, and former Majles Speaker, Karoubi hired ex long-term Tehrani mayor Karbaschi (the one who helped Khatami win in 1998) as his campaign manager. Additionally it should be noted they are both closely associated with Rafsanjani, former president, Revolutionary founding father, and current chief of the Expediency Council.

4) The IRGC, the military wing of the hierocracy, put out a bulletin in their media organ Sobhe Sadegh regarding all of, what they claim to be, Khatami's transgressions. This is a rigorous attack from the conservative group, showing how principal-ists play hardball, even so early on. Example: "with the announcement of Khatami’s ‎candidacy to run in the elections for the tenth president of the Islamic republic, his ‎supporters have entered the realm of foreign anti-Iranian media in an effort to create ‎support for him."

5) Basij ("volunteers", a group of officially sanctioned thugs) has been officially tasked by Khamenei, via the IRGC commander Ja'afari, to "stand against those who want to hurt the tight relations between the Leader and [Iranian] nation." This only gives a blank check to basij to rough up any large student demonstrators, for instance, who are pro-reform, and against the status quo.

6) Dark horse candidates wait in the wings. Maybe Ahmadinejad might not actually be the candidate the principal-ists decide to go with, especially if Khamenei decides Khatami's popularity is overtaking Ahmadinejad's chances. Tehran mayor Qalibaf for instance maybe will be better. Or a dark horse unnamed (I have my suspicions already). As far as the reformists go, if former prime minster Mousavi enters (which he still may), along with Karoubi, or maybe Rowhani (former chief nuclear negotiator), this could dilute Khatami's influence. Although it is worthy to note the true popularity Khatami enjoys.

But it's not like a game who's close examination will yield results one could prognosticate from. Even with all these happenings lately, who the hell actually knows what the regime is going to do? The Guardian Council can flag whoever it wants as not "Islamic" enough to compete in the competition, eliminating possibly their biggest threat, like Khatami (although this would be a huge decision that would be extremely unpopular and would destabilize the regime a tiny bit for the moment, also probably bringing boycott to the elections from the liberal-minded). Although I don't predict that will happen yet (I'll be watching the 'official' rhetoric though).

Although a few weeks before Khatami announced his candidacy he did meet with Khamenei, so it appears that he has been sanctioned by the Leader to actually compete. They have a history of family relations that goes way back, and Khatami is a strong supporter of the Revolutionary ideology. He is just much more, um...open and pragmatically international.

Well, we'll see what the next few months have to offer. The election is really 'ON'. It will be important to watch the regime's crackdown on the citizenry, especially reformist media, student protests (already in progress), reform-minded blogsters, and reformist offices. Basij will operate in full force.

In my opinion the elections are actually designed within the Constitution to only reinforce and sustain the status quo. But maybe I'm cynical based on 30 Revolutionary regime years, and 30 elections that have held the hierocracy in place... To be fair, I'll reread the Constitution and reconsider...

Khamenei as absolute arbiter

Not only is Khamenei a qualified arbiter of Shi'i shari'a, he will also be the complete arbiter on US-Iranian bilateral relations. Roger Cohen's piece in the NYTimes today hits the issue right on the head (although I may be a little more skeptic of what can turn Khamenei towards the US):

I’d say the central Iranian political phenomenon of recent years has been the reinforcement of Khamenei. How to engage with Iran begins and ends with him.

While rhetoric is flying from all talking heads of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), Ahmadinejad, Foreign Minister Mottaki, Majlis speaker Larijani, Rafsanjani, etc., etc., it is Khamenei and the hierocracy that will have the say. While the "elected" President and his cadre of cabinet ministers, along with the legislature, may have a more tempered tone vis-à-vis the US, the line from the hierocracy; its mouthpiece Kayhan News; and its military wing, The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), is clear: There will be no rapprochement from the IRI at this moment, and the government can talk all it wants about it, but the Supreme Leader has total control.

The “principalists” from the hierocracy take a harsh, and highly distrustful tone. Mullahs from Khamenei, to influential Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts members like Ayatollahs Jannati or Khatami (not the reformist ex-president hojjat-e Islam Khatami) have been using ‘Revolutionary’ rhetoric as of late, displaying the foreign distrust so crucial to the ideology of the IRI. But it can be noted that this rhetoric is not completely antagonistic, such as violent slogans or demands for US “death”, towards the US. This is particularly noticeable in the official Tehran Friday prayers conducted over the last few weeks by Rafsanjani, and Ayatollah's Khatami and Jannati.

But even with forthcoming overtures of diplomatic relations from the Obama Administration along with tempered mullah rhetoric, Khamenei has shown a very important characteristic of his worldview: his complete, intense, and full-scale mistrust of US interest. He characterizes the US as “feeling weak”, enlightening his belief that US overtures are only based on its now weakened regional position opposite Iran. As is laid out in Article 110 of the IRI Constitution, his power over policy is absolute with his ability to say 'yay' or 'nay' on any policy enacted by any body in the IRI government structure.

While some in the government have displayed a desire to engage in the possibility of bilateral relations resuming, the Supreme Leader expresses his deep-seated and personal mistrust of foreign approach (remember he was arrested and tortured by SAVAK, believed to be an arm of the CIA, six times before Khomeini's return). From his rhetoric there is no reason to believe he will reign in all discourse of possible engagement by his government, but Khamenei’s position will unlikely change in the current climate, especially as the stakes raise with uranium enrichment ongoing.

Am I completely cynical, desiring military force, or a drop in diplomatic tone by the Obama Administration? Do I think engagement can only actually happen after Khamenei dies (probably a long time from now)? No, definitely not. But I don't see elections in June actually bettering the possibility, whether Khatami (or Mousavi or Rowhani, if they run) wins against the "principle-ists" or not. The US must engage Khamenei (preferably through back channels to begin) and will have to accept nuclear technology existing on IRI soil. Khamenei has already issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons so he can easily prevent weaponization without issue, but nuclear technology in general carries the torch of cultural and scientific self-sufficiency, both major principals of the Revolution that Khamenei is vehemently loyal to.

Mr. Sharansky, Politics Are Not Universal.

Former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky wrote in the LA Times in an opinion piece last week urging the Obama Administration to work directly with dissidents from around the world. He argues that

Meeting with democratic leaders is terribly important for dissidents because, even when they are not in prison, they are generally isolated in their own countries. Meeting the leader of the free world transforms the dissident in the eyes of his people from a lonely Don Quixote to the person who can expose the truth about their suffering to the outside world and influence the world to take action to address it.

But this isn't always true. In fact, regarding Iran, a state who is vigorously opposed to any foreign tampering, this plan would completely backfire, bolstering the ideologues who would only solidify anti-US policy and nationalism. Dissident engagement often signals to said nation that regime change is the policy. While it may not be so clear, for instance when Bush demanded the release of Egyptian dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim in August 2001, he was not advocating the downfall of the Mubarak regime, but he was advocating for a certain opening of the public space that is not available to Egyptians, and opening that space can certainly threaten the regime.

In Iran no political party, or legitimate political group, can be seen as 'appeasing' the United States. This stems from a culture of anti-US sentiment created after the US-orchestrated coup d'état of 1953. The strength of this is largely withering away as the Revolution's generation gets older and the younger segments of the population grow more detached from revolutionary politics, yet it can easily return as soon as the hard-line parties seize upon a mistake by the pragmatists. Therefore, if the pragmatists are seen as willing to negotiate with the US because of US pressures their legitimacy will be undermined throughout Iran when the hardliners cast them as US appeasers.

As Dr. Farideh Farhi, Independent Researcher and Affiliate Graduate Faculty at the University of Hawai'i-Manoa, said at a conference in DC just a couple weeks ago with other experts, 'It is no use trying to game the Iranian political parties, or dissidents, against each other'. It is a no-win competition for the US.

So Mr. Sharansky, while your liberal intentions are positive, one must see the singularities in each scenario before more damage is done.